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Book Reviews 
THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH, AND 
NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH ABOUT "HIGH 
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS" AND THE 
CONSTITUTION'S IMPEACHMENT 
PROCESS 
HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: THE CASE 
AGAINST BILL CLINTON. By Ann Coultee Regnery 
Publishing, Inc. 1998. Pp. 358. $24.95. 
Vikram David Amal 
On the first page of her bestselling book, High Crimes and 
Misdemeanors, Ann Coulter observes that political punditry and 
careful legal analysis are very different things. (p. 1) This in-
sight-the truth of which has been driven home, painfully at 
times, to anyone with cable over the last few years-may seem 
unremarkable. But it does pose great difficulties for someone 
like me, steeped as I am in the legal academy, in reviewing her 
book. For High Crimes and Misdemeanors does not purport to 
be a thorough, analytic, balanced and rigorous treatment of the 
impeachment process, either in general or as applied to Presi-
dent Clinton. And it would be unfair for me to hold it to the 
standards of good academic scholarship. 
On the other hand, good academic scholars should care 
about the things Ms. Coulter asserts in her book, for a few rea-
sons. To begin with, the book sets out an interesting, though by 
no means uncontested, synthesis of the events surrounding vari-
I. Attorney and Legal Affairs Correspondent for Human Events. 
2. Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings; Visiting Professor of Law, 
University of California at Berkeley. A.B. 1985 University of California at Berkeley; 
J.D. 1988 Yale Law School. 
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ous of President Clinton's legal/political problems. The facts she 
alleges and the evidence she adduces concerning matters outside 
the Starr Report-such as Whitewater, Filegate and the Travel 
Office episode-should perhaps be taken with a healthy dose of 
salt, especially given that Judge Starr and his office apparently 
have disagreed with Ms. Coulter as to the weight of the actual 
proof of wrongdoing. But Ms. Coulter's depiction of these affairs 
is interesting reading nonetheless, and helps paint a picture of 
President Clinton's personality that may help to explain-better 
than any legal niceties ever could-why so many persons, both 
within and without Congress, simply cannot abide Mr. Clinton. 
The book's factual account of the Monica Lewinsky matter 
is better grounded, by references to grand jury and civil deposi-
tion testimony and other supporting documentation, and pro-
vides a good starting point for any discussion-on the Hill or in 
the ivory tower-about the impeachability of Mr. Clinton. For 
that reason alone, people really interested in factually unraveling 
the mess that has preoccupied Washington will find the book 
worth skimming. But perhaps more important than any of this, 
the more general arguments the book makes, about the nature 
of the impeachment process and its alternatives, both reflect and 
in tum help shape the perceptions held by the reading public and 
those in Congress. And because nearly everyone agrees that 
there is no (or virtually no) judicial review of the Presidential 
impeachment process, the impressions of Congresspersons and 
the public are the impressions that count. One could argue that 
in the long run the Constitution always means what the People 
who continue to make it the Supreme Law of the Land believe it 
to mean. Whether that statement is descriptively true about the 
entire Constitution or not, it is certainly true about the im-
peachment provisions, which are self-consciously styled as a hy-
brid of law and politics. Thus, what Ms. Coulter is saying in this 
book is constitutionally important merely because she has been 
saying it to so many and such impressionable people. 
What she says about the facts of !he Monica Lewinsky epi-
sode is, as I just suggested, within ttc mainstream of both Re-
publican and larger American opinion. At bottom, she demon-
strates that President Clinton had an extremely unseemly, 
inappropriate and unwise physical (I'll avoid the contested term 
"sexual" here) affair, and that he lied in order to cover it up, 
sometimes while he was under oath, and at other times looking 
the American people in the eye. I think Ms. Coulter is basically 
right about these facts. But when Ms. Coulter goes on to discuss 
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the constitutional backdrop against which these facts ought to be 
considered, her arguments are much weaker-even when judged 
by standards less Figorous than those employed in law reviews. 
Ironically, many of the failings of Ms. Coulter's description and 
analysis of the Constitution resemble in form the failings of Mr. 
Clinton's factual statements concerning the Lewinsky affair. 
That is, like the President she detests (and she makes no bones 
about detesting him), Ms. Coulter is often guilty of telling half-
truths-statements that may be in some sense technically true 
but which are terribly misleading3 -about the Constitution. In 
the balance of this short review, I shall explain and try to set the 
record straight as to some of the most important of these consti-
tutional half-truths. 
HALF-TRUTH #1: IMPEACHABLE CONDUCT NEED 
NOT BE CRIMINAL, AND MAY BE "PRIVATE" IN 
NATURE 
Ms. Coulter quite correctly debunks the myth that the 
phrase "bribery, treason and other high crimes and misdemean-
ors" refers only to matters that would be considered criminally 
indictable in a federal or state court. Quick reference to history 
and common sense confirms this result. The impeachment of 
federal judges in the early 19th century for inability to perform 
job duties on account of senility or habitual drunkenness, as well 
as the extensive discussions on the relevance of the criminal law 
to impeachment undertaken in the Andrew Johnson impeach-
ment proceedings, strongly refute the idea that conduct need 
violate some criminal statute in order to support impeachment 
and conviction. Instead, non-criminal conduct which renders a 
national official incapable or unwilling to faithfully discharge his 
public trust will support removal. And this has to be the case. 
Imagine a President who simply ran off on vacation for months 
at a time, even (or especially) during times of national crisis, 
phoning in once a week for messages.4 Even though such irre-
sponsible conduct runs afoul of no criminal statute, could a sen-
3. By this I do not mean to suggest that the President is guilty only of half-truths. 
Some of his statements, including some statements under oath, such as his statements 
that he couldn't recall being alone with Ms. Lewinsky, or that he couldn't recall any spe-
cific gifts she gave him or any specific conversations he had with her, can only be fairly 
characterized as outright lies. 
4. A variant on this hypothetical, as well as other convincing hypotheticals, can be 
found in Charles Black, Impeachment: A Handbook 33-49 (Yale U. Press, 1974). 
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sible Constitution (and ours is nothing if not sensible) bind the 
country to four years of such (non)rule? 
Ms. Coulter is also technically accurate when asserting that 
"private" misconduct can justify Presidential impeachment. 
Suppose a President committed murder or rape for purely pri-
vate reasons. The fact that such misdeeds were committed by the 
President not in his capacity as President but rather in capacity 
as individual, and the fact that the victim was not the public fisc, 
surely does not mean the country is stuck with a murderer or 
rapist as President for his entire elected term.5 Indeed, because 
1-along with people from Laurence Tribe to Robert Bork-be-
lieve that a sitting President is not criminally prosecutable while 
in office,6 my view is that impeachment for the commission of 
abhorrent crimes like murder, which render the President abso-
lutely unable to credibly lead, is the only way to remove.7 
5. Here I part company with the House Judiciary Committee Report in the An-
drew Johnson impeachment affair, which concluded that "private" misconduct, even 
murder, might not be the basis for impeachment. See Michael Les Benedict, The Im-
peachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson 74-80 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1973). I also part 
company with some of the statements made by esteemed constitutional law scholars, 
such as Cass Sunstein, before the House Judiciary Committee investigating President 
Ointon, to the same effect. 
6. The simplest way to see that federalism and separation of powers precludes 
prosecution of a sitting President is to ask, "who would be empowered to prosecute 
him?" A state prosecutor and grand jury, which represents only a smaU locality and its 
parochial disagreements with a President? (Imagine a South Carolina grand jury and dis-
trict attorney having the power to indict and prosecute newly-elected President Abraham 
Lincoln in 1861). A United States Attorney, who is "inferior" and accountable to, as well 
as removable by, the President himself? Or an "independent" counsel, who answers to 
no one? Even assuming the Independent Counsel Act is constitutional as applied to the 
President (a question not addressed in Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)), actual 
prosecution of a sitting President raises even more constitutional problems than investi-
gations and reports. To put the point another way, there is a big difference between a 
referral to Congress (which then has the power to act and the accountability to the entire 
People of the country when it does act) and a criminal prosecution itself. For a discus-
sion of this issue, as well as other issues such as the practical question whether a con-
victed President could preside from prison, see Akhil Reed Amar and Brian C. Kalt, The 
Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution, 2 Nexus J. Op. 11 (1997). 
Nor is the question of presidential susceptibility to prosecution resolved by the Su-
preme Court's decision in the Paula Jones civil case. It goes without saying that criminal 
prosecution of the President threatens the ability of the executive branch to function 
much more than does the specter of civil litigation and liability. Moreover, Paula Jones 
had but one redress for her alleged injuries-civillitigation. Impeachment simply would 
not have solved Ms. Jones' problem. By contrast, where criminal misdeeds are alleged, 
the public-in whose name any criminal action would be brought-can vindicate its in-
terests through the impeachment process. 
7. As an aside, let me set the record straight on a non-truth Ms. Coulter asserts 
about the impeachability of Congresspersons. Notwithstanding her suggestions, (p. 265) 
House members and Senators are not "officers" within the meaning of the impeachment 
clauses of the Constitution and are thus not impeachable. Each member of the House 
and Senate can be expelled by two-thirds of his chamber. See U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 5, cl. 
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So much for the "truth" part of the half-truth. It is where 
Ms. Coulter goes with these technically accurate points that I am 
disinclined to follow. Based on the constitutional principles dis-
cussed thus far, Ms. Coulter concludes that President Clinton's 
conduct easily qualifies as impeachable. If the only applicable 
constitutional principles were the ones she describes, I might 
agree with her. But they are not, and I do not. Let me be clear. 
I am not saying that the President's alleged misconduct relating 
to the Paula Jones and Monica Lewinsky matter did not ulti-
mately satisfy the constitutional threshold of impeachability. I 
am saying that if it did, it did so barely, not easily. 
The disagreement I have with Ms. Coulter here is not sim-
ply one of applying law (the Constitution) to alleged facts. In-
stead, I fault Ms. Coulter-and characterize her argument as 
misleadingly incomplete-for not laying out all of the law (the 
Constitution) itself. Remarkably, Ms. Coulter never carefully 
parses the provision in the Constitution that is most closely on 
point-Article ll's statement that the President (and other civil 
officers) can be impeached, convicted and removed for "bribery, 
treason and other high crimes and misdemeanors." Ms. Coulter 
simply never analyzes, as a good lawyer must, what the text says. 
To begin with, notice that the Constitution here refers to 
"high" crimes and misdemeanors, not just ordinary crimes-
which are referred to elsewhere in the Constitution. What does 
"high" mean in this setting? Again, the text of the Constitution 
is instructive in its specification of "other" high crimes and mis-
demeanors-namely, bribery and treason. That the Constitution 
lists these two grave offenses as its only examples of "high" mis-
conduct suggests that "high" really does mean serious indeed. 
So whether or not conduct has to be similar in kind to bribery 
and treason to be impeachable, it-as a matter of constitutional 
text-has to be similar in height, or gravity. Thus, although non-
criminal and private misconduct can render a President im-
peachable, it must be high non-criminal and private misconduct. 
For this reason, Ms. Coulter's repeated assertion that the Presi-
dent's illicit and inappropriate affair with Ms. Lewinsky by itself 
would support (indeed would require) impeachment-even 
without any consideration of perjury or obstruction of justice-
borders on the absurd.8 A consensual yet stupid affair with a 
2. See generally, Akhil Reed Amar and Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succes-
sion Law Constitutional? 48 Stan. L. Rev. 113, 115-16 (1995). 
8. She makes this assertion a number of times. (pp. 9, 258, 312) 
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somewhat unstable underling simply cannot be characterized as 
high misconduct of a gravity akin to bribery or treason. 
Whether Mr. Clinton's public deceits and lies can be 
thought of in terms as serious as bribery and treason poses a 
more difficult question. But here, too, Ms. Coulter's analysis is 
clipped and doesn't present enough of the whole constitutional 
backdrop to enable a reader to evaluate her conclusions. Apart 
from the textual inferences described above, that backdrop con-
sists of a structure and history of the Constitution (and of the 
state constitutions enacted between 1776 and 1787), all of which 
suggest that quintessential impeachable misdeeds are those 
which seriously corrupt or subvert the process of government it-
self and the country's faith in the fundamental integrity of its 
leadership. Bribery and treason have this corrosive effect. So 
would murder, by demonstrating utter contempt for the most 
deeply-held American values and beliefs. The ultimate ques-
tion-both as a legal and as a political matter-is whether the 
offense is the kind of high misconduct that unfits a man to serve 
in the White House even though he was duly elected. How does 
Mr. Clinton fare under this standard? As I explain in a little fur-
ther detail below, I think the answer depends on a number of 
things. My own view is that the obstruction of justice allegations 
were more serious in nature than the perjury allegations,9 but 
that proof of obstruction has always been weaker than proof of 
lying. For now, let me just say that I find it hard to understand 
how Ms. Coulter cannot agonize over her view at all. 
One other point bears mention in this context. To say that 
conduct need not be criminal to be impeachable does not mean 
that the criminal realm is irrelevant to impeachability. Consis-
tent with her general tendency, Ms. Coulter recognizes part of, 
but not all of, the relevance of the criminal law. She correctly 
observes that serious crimes (like murder) will often (she says 
almost always) evince sufficient immorality to constitute "high 
crimes and misdemeanors." (p. 6) But she fails to mention to 
her readers that when certain criminal conduct is unlikely to be 
9. I think obstruction-if it takes the form alleged in the Ointon episode-is a 
more serious corruption of government than is lying under oath. One reason is that cor-
rupting others, such as Monica Lewinsky or Sidney Blumenthal, is more akin to bribery 
than is simple perjury, because obstruction on these facts involves more than one person. 
There is a legal as well as philosophical underpinning to this intuition. Legally, involving 
others in one's criminality has always been an aggravating circumstance. It is for this rea-
son that the law punishes conspiracy independently from the underlying criminal acts 
agreed to. Philosophically, using other people for one's own corrupt ends seems to vio-
late Kantian notions of respect and autonomy. 
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prosecuted criminally by federal and state prosecutors because it 
doesn't seem unusual and/or serious enough to warrant court 
and jail time, that fact also bears on the "height" of the mis-
deeds. If the vast majority of state and federal prosecutors 
would not find the alleged misconduct of Mr. Clinton, even if 
proven, to be serious enough to warrant criminal prosecution, 
that should count as a relevant (though not always dispositive) 
consideration that Ms. Coulter fails to ever adequately address. 
HALF-TRUTH #2: PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PERJURY 
WAS IMPEACHABLE, BECAUSE PERJURY HAS 
HISTORICALLY BEEN CONSIDERED A SERIOUS 
CRIME AND BECAUSE FEDERAL JUDGES HAVE BEEN 
IMPEACHED, CONVICTED AND REMOVED BECAUSE 
OF PERJURY 
This line of argument, which runs through Ms. Coulter's 
discussion, (p. 280) is less than fully accurate in a number of re-
spects. For starters, it ignores the differences between the Presi-
dent and federal judges. Unlike judges, the President himself 
represents an entire branch of the Federal government; he and 
he alone sits atop and controls the entire executive branch. Un-
like Article III, which vests federal judicial power in the Su-
preme and lower federal courts (which consist of hundreds of in-
dividuals), the Constitution-in Article 11-vests the entirety of 
the executive power in a single person- the President. A related 
difference between federal judges (as well as the Vice President 
and cabinet members, for that matter) on the one hand, and the 
President on the other, is that the President alone enjoys a per-
sonal electoral mandate from the millions of citizens who voted 
for him. Undoing that mandate is a bigger deal for a democratic 
republic than is removing an unelected judge.10 Also, since fed-
eral judges serve for life, impeachment and conviction is the only 
way to prevent years, perhaps decades, of continued officehold-
ing. A President can, of course, always be removed electorally at 
the next election.11 Finally, of relevance to the Clinton matter, 
10. Some have argued that the Constitution's admonition that federal judges hold 
their offices during "good behaviour," see U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1, also distinguishes 
them from the President. As I read the history, however, the term "good behavior" was 
intended to mean "for life." See generally, Note, Bribery and Other Not So "Good Be-
havior:" Criminal Prosecution as a Supplement to Impeachment of Federal Judges, 94 
Colum. L. Rev. 1617 (1994). For this reason, I am hesitant to conclude that the "good 
behaviour" clause means that federal judges can be impeached and removed for some-
thing less than "high crimes and misdemeanors." 
II. If the President is serving his second full term, removal at the conclusion of that 
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judges are more closely associated in the public's mind with the 
integrity of judicial processes than are executive branch officials. 
For all these reasons, the same clause of the Constitution-Arti-
cle I's "bribery, treason and other high crimes and misdemean-
ors" -can have a different meanin~ when applied to the Presi-
dent as opposed to federal judges.' And yet Ms. Coulter does 
not consider, let alone address, any of these things. 
Even if one were to reject all of this, and conclude as a mat-
ter of impeachment (common) law that because perjury has 
been a basis for impeaching federal judges, it must also satisfy 
the high crimes and misdemeanors threshold as to the President, 
Ms. Coulter's analysis would still be so incomplete as to be mis-
leading. Crucially, she writes (and many others talk) as if all 
conduct that constitutes "high crimes and misdemeanors" MUST 
be pursued by the House and the Senate. She speaks in terms of 
the public's and Congress' "obligation" to impeach, and "duty" 
to remove. (pp. 18-19) She never identifies the source of these 
obligations and duties-and for good reason; the Constitution 
simply does not embody them. Once again, the text of Article I 
(which Ms. Coulter never really analyzes) is instructive: "the 
House ... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment"13 and 
"[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeach-
ments."14 Thus, the Constitution speaks only of power, not of 
duty. Other Congressional powers conferred in the Constitu-
tion-such as the power to regulate interstate commerce, to bor-
row money, to create lower federal courts-are all understood to 
be discretionary; there is no textual or historical reason to think 
that the impeachment power alone does not include the discre-
term is automatic under the Twenty-Second Amendment. 
Obviously, there are differences between a President and federal judges that in some 
circumstances may make a President more worthy of impeachment. For example, a se-
nile President with his finger on the button poses a more serious threat than any federal 
judge. And the fact that the President owes his job to the People makes his lies to the 
American public, whether under oath or not, more serious than similar lies by a federal 
judge. The big point here is not that Presidential impeachment standards are necessarily 
higher than those for federal judges; instead, the point is merely that the two settings in-
volve different considerations, such that judicial impeachment precedent should have 
been of limited relevance in the Ointon episode. 
12. My brother has invoked an analogy to the Senate's advice and consent function 
here. There is only one "advice and consent" clause, U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, but that 
clause means something very different, constitutionally speaking, when it is applied to 
Cabinet members than when it is applied to Supreme Court Justices. See Akhil Reed 
Amar, Trial and Tribulation, New Republic 17 (Jan. 18, 1999). 
13. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 2, cl. 5 (emphasis added). 
14. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 3, cl. 6 (emphasis added). 
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tion not to exercise it to the hilt.15 Thus, the House need not 
prosecute all high crimes and misdemeanors; and the Senate 
H 16 need not try all cases the ouse presses. 
All of this begs the question: how should Congress exercise 
the discretion that it enjoys in this context? I would suggest a 
few considerations that Congress should always keep in mind. 
First is the setting in which the alleged misconduct took place. 
Not all perjuries are alike. For example, suppose President 
Clinton were asked in the Paula Jones case deposition if he has 
always loved his wife during their marriage. (This question, ar-
gue Jones' lawyers, would go to the question of motive to seek 
extramarital sex.) And suppose further that, regardless of any 
objections he may have had available to him, he answered the 
question, and answered it with a "yes." He then walked out of 
the room, and confided to his new paramour that he had an-
swered that way only to spare Mrs. Clinton's feelings-that he 
hadn't loved her for some time, but that he didn't want to fur-
ther embarrass her. Would this be perjury? Quite possibly. 
Would it thus be a "high crime or misdemeanor?" Maybe not. 
Would it be worthy of impeachment? Certainly not. Context is 
key. 17 And although Presidential supporters oversimplify when 
they argue that the whole impeachment charge was about sex 
(surely lies under oath and to the American people are matters 
of public concern), we ought never to forget the factual context 
in which the President's deceitful conduct occurred.18 
The second consideration that ought to inform the House 
and Senate is the public interest. Grand juries and prosecutors 
(the House), as well as judges and petit juries (the Senate) are all 
15. Where Article I commands Congress or either House to do something in par-
ticular, the Constitution's words are clear. See, e.g., U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2, clause 5 
("[t)he House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers"); § 3, 
clause 5 ("[t)he Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tem-
pore"); § 4, clause 2 ("[t)he Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year"); § 5, 
clause 3 ("[e)ach House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time 
publish the same.") 
16. In a similar vein, in the criminal setting, grand juries and prosecutors enjoy dis-
cretion not to indict, and petit juries enjoy discretion not to convict when to do so would 
create injustice. 
17. You could play the same game with other crimes. If President Ointon assaulted 
Trent Lott to force him to vote in favor of legislation pushed by the President, this as-
sault would be much more impeachment-worthy than a punch in the nose thrown by the 
President in response to a wisecrack someone made about Chelsea as the first family was 
walking down the street. Just as all assaults are not equally serious, so too with lies, even 
lies under oath. 
18. This, of course, is one of the features that distinguishes the recently concluded 
impeachment episode from Watergate and President Nixon's misconduct. 
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supposed to discharge their duties consistent with the public in-
terest, and yet the aspect of the whole impeachment that has 
beeR most intriguing is the way in which the informed and ex-
pressed will of the American people was almost explicitly ig-
nored by Congress. Now I am certainly not suggesting that good 
leadership in Congress requires that the House and Senate al-
ways heed the latest overnight poll. But when a supermajority of 
the People of the United States-who ordained, established and 
perpetuate the Constitution itself-are informed (as they surely 
have been) of the facts, and then repeatedly express the opinion 
that the President's alleged misconduct does not warrant a 
change of leadership, it is hard to understand why this doesn't 
count.19 What better way to ascertain the public interest than to 
listen to the informed and repeated views of the public itself. 
There has been one other constitutional change since 1787 
that makes the People's desire to retain the President worthy of 
more respect, and that is the decline in the independence of the 
electoral college. Like the Senate, the Presidency is a much 
more populist institution today than it was under the original 
Constitution; as a result, displacing a President whom the People 
favor today is undoing the People's choice in a very direct way, 
and requires taking that choice by the People into account. 
I think the situation is somewhat different where the People 
are clamoring for removal rather than retention. In that kind of 
case, about which the framers did express concern, I think the 
will of the People, while still relevant, should count for less, and 
there is more room for independent Congressional judgment. 
Thus, in the end, I think Congress and the American people 
must each be of the view that removal is warranted before Presi-
dential impeachment should go forward; if either thinks removal 
is too hasty, the status quo of retention is and ought to be pre-
served. Why do I view the constitutional role of the People in 
19. In this vein, it bears noting that the framers specifically rested impeachment in 
Congress (rather than the Supreme Court) to ensure some accountability. And the inclu-
sion of the House in the process-which is the one aspect of the plan that never changed 
from the beginning of the Convention-seems intended to make sure that some body 
close to the People would be involved. (Indeed, in describing the House's role in the im-
peachment process in Federalist 65, Alexander Hamilton refers to the House as the "rep-
resentatives of the people, (the] accusers." Federalist 65 (Hamilton) in Ointon Rossiter, 
ed., The Federalist Papers, 396, 398 (Mentor, 1961).) And after the Seventeenth 
Amendment, which brought the Senate closer to the People by providing for direct elec-
tion of Senators, even the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment should take serious 
account of the People's wishes. See generally, Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of 
Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1347,1389-1405 (1996). 
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these asymmetrical terms-counting more in one direction than 
the other? Begin with the distinction drawn in the Constitu-
tional text between Congressional duty and power. Congress 
has the duty to refuse impeachment for anything less than "high 
crimes and misdemeanors," whereas once that threshold is 
cleared, the Constitution imposes no obligation to do anything. 
Obligatory duties, unlike discretionary powers, one might argue, 
require independent assessment. Beyond that, my asymmetrical 
intuition in favor of independent interpretation and Presidential 
retention flows from the essentially conservative nature of the 
impeachment provisions in the Constitution generally. 
Consider first the involvement of BOTH houses of Con-
gress. That structure means that an overwhelming majority of 
members of Congress ( 435 house members and 66 Senators, or 
501 total) could favor impeachment and removal, but the will of 
a mere 34 Senators would carry the day. That's a conservative 
design-in the same way that other federal processes are conser-
vatively designed. Take legislation, where each of the four fed-
eral institutions in essence has a one-branch veto. If the House 
kills a bill, it's dead. If the Senate kills it, it's dead. If the Presi-
dent vetoes it or declines to enforce it, it is meaningless. And if 
courts find it unlawful, it cannot be enforced. Alexander Hamil-
ton explained this bias in favor of the status quo in Federalist # 
73 in terms of error costs: "to keep things in the same state in 
which they happen to be at any given period [is] much more 
likely to do good than harm ... The injury which may possibly 
be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply compen-
sated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones."20 I 
think the same rationale informs the structure of Presidential 
impeachment provisions. 
Consider too in this regard another federal process, and one 
which is often analogized to impeachment-criminal prosecu-
tion. In any criminal case, all 23 grand jurors and 11 of 12 petit 
jurors could vote to convict, and yet a single petit juror can pre-
serve the status quo. No one doubts that each institution and in-
dividual in that process should independently agree on culpabil-
ity before there is a conviction, even though leniency in 
deference to community sentiment is perfectly appropriate. 
Indeed, the impeachment process in at least one way seems 
to privilege the status quo even more than does the criminal pro-
cess. Recall the 2/3 supermajority requirement in Senate im-
20. Federalist 73 (Hamilton) at 441 (cited in note 19). 
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peachment. Ordinarily, in a civil or criminal jury setting, when 
fewer than the requisite supermajority agree on a result either 
way, we say there has been a hung jury. But in impeachment, 
when fewer than 67 Senators vote to convict, we say the im-
peached person is acquitted-even though 67 did not vote 
against conviction. This has been true from the beginning of the 
Republic all the way through William Rehnquist's pronounce-
ment that Bill Clinton was acquitted. It takes 67 to convict, but 
only 34 to acquit. That's asymmetry. 
This constitutional preference for the status quo depends, of 
course, on the legitimacy of the status quo to begin with. I think 
Presidents who prevail in honest elections have always had a 
strong claim to legitimacy under our Constitution-Presidential 
elections have always been big things (and here I would draw a 
distinction between Clinton and Andrew Johnson, who was 
never elected President, and even between Clinton and Richard 
Nixon, whose electoral victory was tainted by alleged campaign 
improprieties). And that claim to legitimacy has only grown 
stronger as the role of the People in directly electing their Presi-
dent has itself grown, in ways mentioned above. 
HALF-TRUTH #3: IMPEACHMENT IS AN APPROPRIATE 
REMEDY FOR GROSS (NO PUN INTENDED) 
PRESIDENTIAL MISCONDUCT 
Once again, this argument may be accurate as far as it goes, 
but it doesn't go far enough. In particular, it suggests that an 
appropriate remedy-impeachment-is the only appropriate 
remedy. And that is simply not the case. Ms. Coulter makes 
only passing (and derogatory) mention of censure or findings of 
fact or other non-removal alternatives, (p. 287) but any account 
of the Clinton fiasco that aspires to anything resembling 
comprehensiveness must discuss this very important topic. 
A few things are constitutionally clear. When a President is 
impeached by the House and convicted by two-thirds of the Sen-
ate, removal from office is automatic, and disqualification from 
future office-holding is within the discretion of the Senate.21 But 
21. One law professor has recently taken issue with this conventional wisdom. In 
"Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process," Occasional Paper# 39, 
University of Chicago Law School, Professor Joseph Isenbergh argues that the standard 
of "high crimes and misdemeanors" is not the only standard that governs impeachments, 
and that Congress has the power to impeach and convict a President for lesser misdeeds, 
in which case it has the power, but not the obligation, to remove him. Although this is 
not the place to explain all the reasons I disagree with Professor Isenbergh's position, let 
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nothing in the Constitution says that a Congress that starts down 
the impeachment path cannot explore other avenues as well. 
The power to impeach implies, at the very least, the power to 
make known the conditions under which impeachment is more 
or less likely. Thus, Congress could always have legitimately de-
cided the President has committed certain reprehensible acts for 
which he must be accountable and then informed the Presi-
dent-either formally or informally-that an apology and dem-
onstration of personal monetary sacrifice by him would have re-
stored public faith in the administration such that he would have 
remained fit for office and thus unimpeachable. The President 
could then have determined for himself whether the conditional 
grant of impeachment immunity was acceptable. If so, impeach-
ment proceedings could have ended; if not, they could have con-
tinued. 
Such a deal, while not judicially enforceable, would not 
have been unconstitutional. It would not necessarily have been 
a forbidden "Bill of Attainder" as some have suggested.22 Bills 
me just observe here that under his reading of the relevant constitutional text, a Presi-
dent could be impeached, convicted and (if Congress felt like it) removed from office by 
a majority of the House and two-thirds of the Senate for vetoing an important piece of 
legislation, whereas overriding the veto itself would require MORE in the way of proc-
ess, that is, a two-thirds majority of both houses. Enough said. 
22. A mere Congressional or one-house censure of the President, without a Con-
gressional request or requirement of apology or monetary sacrifice, would to my mind 
not be a bill of attainder, even without President assent. The reason for this is simple: 
censure alone likely does not "punish" in a legally cognizable way. This is suggested by 
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,713-14 (1976), where the Court held there was no protected 
interest/cognizable injury for purposes of a procedural Due Process claim when police 
distributed to local merchants a flyer identifying plaintiff as a "known active shoplifter" 
notwithstanding the effect such circulation had on his reputation. Like procedural Due 
Process, Bill of Attainder jurisprudence focuses not on whether government can inflict 
injury on an individual, but rather on the process government goes through before in-
flicting the injury. For that reason, Paul is relevant, though not controlling, precedent for 
Congressional censure of President Ointon. Such a permissible censure could take the 
form of separate resolutions by the House and Senate, or a concurrent resolution not 
subject to Presidential presentment. 
Nor is Presidential censure problematic because the Constitution makes no explicit 
mention of any such congressional power. The Senate's sole power to try all impeach-
ments (and/or the House's sole power to initiate impeachments) would provide the req-
uisite enumerated authority. Judges often make findings of fact even when they ulti-
mately conclude that the law affords the plaintiff no relief. And just as judges or juries 
(which may be polled) can explain their results, so too the Senate (or the House, for that 
matter, acting as a grand jury) can explain what it did and did not conclude. In short, 
there is simply no requirement that courts-or the Senate as a court-rule on the ulti-
mate question of guilt or innocence without making or before making any findings of fact 
and sentiment. 
. Two final points: (1) Although there may be sound prudential reasons for waiting 
until after the Senate impeachment Court is dismissed before introducing any motion of 
censure (to avoid confusion about the actual impeachment vote and to avoid any ques-
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of Attainder are person-specific laws enacted by a legislature to 
punish individuals. A conditional grant of impeachment immu-
nity would be person-specific, but because of the context and the 
President's assent it would be lenient rather than punitive. Con-
sider the following analogy: Legislation that provided "Vik 
Amar shall be deported for violating immigration laws" would 
be a Bill of Attainder. But legislation that provided "Vik Amar, 
who has violated immigration laws, shall not be subject to depor-
tation" would not be an attainder, because it would be merciful 
rather than punitive. So too, legislation that provided "Vik 
Amar, who has violated immigration laws, shall not be subject to 
deportation provided he promises not to violate immigration 
laws in the future" would not be a prohibited Bill of Attainder. 
So long as Congress believes that a President may-if he does 
not accept the conditional amnesty-be subject to Congressional 
prosecution and removal, a Congressional offer would be an ex-
ercise of mercy, rather than punishment, when compared to the 
harsher alternative of possible conviction and removal.23 
To put my point another way, the Constitution does not de-
prive Congress of powers that prosecutors traditionally enjoy-
to use prosecutorial discretion to plea bargain in those situations 
where a defendant can still take actions that may make him un-
worthy of the greater sanction.24 Indeed, reading the Constitu-
tion, as many have done, so as to force Congress into an ali-or-
nothing situation may lead to situations in which Congress, the 
President and the People all agree something other than removal 
is in the public interest and yet Congress will have to remove to 
avoid doing nothing at all. Such unnecessary and unwise remov-
als of Presidents could in the long run undermine the power of 
tions about res judicata implications for later civil or criminal litigation), such concerns 
do not rise to the level of constitutional constraints; and (2) Whether the findings are 
styled as a censure or findings of fact would seem to be no constitutional moment. How 
specifically the Senate (or the House, for that matter) wants to be in its factual determi-
nations and condemnations are matters of politics, not constitutional law. 
23. If Congress did not believe the President had committed impeachable deeds in 
the first place, or has already acquitted him in an impeachment trial, of course the situa-
tion is different. In that case, any "deal" requiring the President to do anything would be 
problematic, because Congress would not have authority to take any coercive action 
against the President if he did not comply. Of course, as noted above, see note 22, the 
Congress-or each house-could still issue findings of fact and/or censure. 
24. Nor does the fact that the Constitution does not mention any other offense be-
sides impeachable high crimes and misdemeanors destroy the plea bargain analogy. 
Imagine a child charged with the lowest crime in the statute books-candy shoplifting. A 
prosecutor (or judge) could dismiss the charge before trial on the condition that the child 
steer clear of the complainant store, even though no "lesser" offense is pleaded to. 
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the Presidency and the balance of powers people who adopt the 
ali-or-nothing reading of the Constitution purport to care about. 
Congress could-if it wanted-even go beyond impeach-
ment immunity, and insulate the President from federal (but not 
state) criminal liability after he leaves office.25 Just because 
Presidents enjoy the power to pardon federal criminals does not 
mean that Congress lacks a similar power, provided exercise of 
the power furthers legitimate Congressional objectives.26 
Perhaps many of Ms. Coulter's constitutional half-truths are 
explained by something she says over and over-that impeach-
ment is, and "was supposed to be" partisan.17 To the extent that 
Ms. Coulter means that the process ideally should be partisan 
(and not just that people might suppose that the process would 
devolve into partisanship), I guess I disagree. To be sure, the 
process is and was intended to be "political" -in that the ulti-
mate question of impeachment worthiness is fitness to lead the 
country and the free world politically. But politics and partisan-
ship are not quite the same thing in this context. (p. 12) I 
thought that the two-thirds requirement for conviction in the 
Senate, and the Andrew Johnson and Richard Nixon impeach-
ment episodes earlier in American history made clear that im-
peachment of a sitting President in which few of the people who 
are of the President's party were in favor of ousting him runs 
afoul of our deepest constitutional and democratic ideals. But 
sometimes lessons must be relearned in succeeding generations.28 
Understanding and teaching these is one of the primary missions 
of the legal academy. And if we can get some help from the po-
litical punditry, we'll gladly take it. 
25. Although the matter is not entirely free from difficulty, such immunity would 
not, I believe, be a forbidden "emolument" under Article II, because it would be pro-
spective and speculative (given that criminal liability is not yet affixed). 
26. One obvious Congressional objective jumps to mind-making it easier for the 
President to execute the laws during the balance of his tenure, without being preoccupied 
with jail-time after leaving. Remember, the necessary and proper clause of Article I 
gives Congress the power to make laws to effectuate not just its powers, but the Presi-
dent's and the federal courts' powers as well. 
27. Seep. 19. ("It's supposed to be partisan.")(emphasis in original). But seep. 12 
("When Hamilton described impeachable offenses as 'political,' he did not mean parti-
san.") 
28. In addition to reinforcing the lesson, which should have been internalized after 
Andrew Johnson, that impeachment of a President has to be bipartisan to be worthwhile, 
the Ointon affair may teach a second, related, lesson: Presidential impeachment is ille-
gitimate and irresponsible when few of the citizens who voted in favor of the President 
and gave him the Presidency conclude, after learning the facts, that they want to change 
leadership. 
